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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper examines the association between the level of corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
activities and earnings quality with the level of donation expenses and the voluntary issuance of 
CSR reports filed with the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) as proxies for CSR activities.  
Donation expenditures could be the most direct measure of managers’ willingness to conduct CSR 
activities, while the voluntary issuance of CSR reports filed with GRI captures a direct signal of 
managers’ willingness to conduct CSR activities. The results of this study provide evidence that 
firms active in CSR are likely to report earnings of a higher quality. More specifically, after 
controlling for firm-specific factors, we find that firms with more corporate donations have lower 
discretionary accruals and greater accounting conservatism.  Furthermore, this negative 
relationship between donation and discretionary accruals is more pronounced when firms 
voluntarily issue CSR reports.  Prior studies have focused on the association between financial 
performance and CSR activities of firms.  However, managerial choices and signals on financial 
performance with voluntary CSR activities have not been specifically considered.  This study 
adds to the existing literature on CSR by providing evidence of the role of CSR on earnings quality 
and helps academics and practitioners to understand the role of corporate donations and 
voluntary CSR disclosures in earnings quality. 
 
Keywords: Accounting Conservatism; Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosure; Discretionary Accruals; 
Earnings Quality 
 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
ue to the recent movement toward mutual benefits among companies and society, managers and 
investors are increasingly aware of the importance of social responsibility. Following this movement, 
some firms exert more effort in the area of corporate social responsibility (CSR, hereafter) activities 
than others. CSR activities may represent how managers view integrity. Some managers may have the incentive to 
use CSR activities strategically and opportunistically. In particular, managers who lack integrity may use CSR 
activities to compensate for their opportunistic behaviors. If so, CSR activities are positively associated with 
managers’ opportunistic discretion over financial reporting. On the other hand, ethical and philanthropic managers 
tend to be actively involved in CSR activities as exemplary conduct (Paine, 1994). These managers are likely to 
provide more accurate and reliable financial reports. Thus, the net effect of CSR activities on earnings quality would 
be an empirical question and is of great interest to shareholders and policy makers. 
 
Prior studies on CSR (e.g., Adams and McNicholas, 2007; Carroll, 1999; Dhaliwal et al., 2012; Kim et al., 
2012; Magness, 2006, Orij, 2010) discuss the theoretical background of ethical behavior by firms. According to the 
stakeholder hypothesis, firms’ decisions over monetary donations are heavily influenced by the interests of 
customers, employers, managers, governments, local communities and stockholders (Carroll, 1999; Freeman, 2010; 
D 
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Garriga and Mele, 2004). Collectively, these stakeholders’ influence on firms’ decisions over CSR activities 
represent the stakeholders’ overall philanthropic view (Bentham, 1996; Carroll, 1999). 
 
Lev et al. (2010) argue that firms may conduct CSR activities to develop their reputations because they 
believe a good reputation leads to increased sales. Johnson (1966) reports that firms in a monopolistically 
competitive market use charitable contributions as a means of gaining a strategic advantage over their competitors. 
Dhaliwal et al. (2012) report that CSR disclosures affect analysts’ behavior in a more favorable way. Hobson and 
Kachelmeier (2005) suggest that managers may have an incentive to misuse CSR disclosures to compensate for poor 
quality of earnings. Paine (1994), however, suggests that firms are encouraged to display more ethical conduct to 
prevent behavior that damages the firm’s value. Using the stakeholder hypothesis, Jones (1995) presents that firms 
have an incentive to demonstrate their philanthropic and ethical behavior when they run their business with integrity. 
Such firms are more likely to participate in CSR activities and to provide reliable financial statements. 
 
To test whether CSR activities are driven by integrity or opportunistic motivation, we examine the 
association between earnings quality and the level of corporate donations and/or the voluntary issuance of CSR 
reports. To examine whether CSR activities are associated with the quality of earnings, we use two voluntary CSR 
activities: donation expenditures (Card et al., 2010) and the voluntary issuance of CSR reports (Dhaliwal et al., 
2011). We use discretionary accruals (Dechow et al., 1995; Jones, 1991; Kothari et al., 2005) and accounting 
conservatism (Givoly and Hayn, 2000; Penman and Zhang, 2002) as proxies for the earnings quality of firms with 
donations and the voluntary issuance of CSR reports filed with the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI, hereafter).
1
 
 
After controlling for firm-specific factors, we find evidence that firms active in CSR activities by means of 
monetary donations have lower discretionary accruals and greater accounting conservatism consistent with higher 
earnings quality. We also find some evidence that firms that both report more donation expenditures and issue 
voluntary CSR reports filed with GRI are even more likely to have higher earnings quality. 
 
We believe that this study adds to the existing literature on CSR by providing further evidence of the role of 
CSR on earnings quality. This study helps academics and practitioners to understand the role of corporate donations 
and voluntary CSR disclosure in earnings quality. The results of this study also helps capital market participants by 
providing evidence that a firm’s CSR activities are related to manager integrity in regards to financial reporting.  
 
The rest of this paper is organized into five sections. The second section presents the study background and 
develops the hypotheses. The third section discusses the research method and the data selection procedures. The 
fourth section presents empirical results, and the last section concludes the study. 
 
II.  BACKGROUND and HYPOTHESES 
 
Corporate donations and voluntary issuance of CSR reports 
 
Hess et al. (2002) report that people have a more favorable impression of donations as forms of the 
provision of products, services, and cash as compared to volunteering by employees as a means of participating in 
communities. These provisions are recorded as donation expenses in firms’ income statements. According to the 
stakeholder hypothesis, firms’ decisions over CSR activities are heavily influenced by the interests of customers, 
employers, managers, governments, local communities, and stockholders (Bentham, 1996; Carroll, 1999; Freeman, 
2010; Garriga and Mele, 2004; Orij, 2010). Thus, donations may reflect stakeholders’ views of philanthropic 
activities (Jones, 1995). 
 
 
                                           
1
 The Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) is the most authoritative program of global standardization for corporate sustainability 
reporting endorsed by the United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP). 
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Lev et al. (2010) suggest that firms may conduct CSR activities to develop their reputations, as they believe 
a good reputation results in increased sales. Dhaliwal et al. (2012) report that the disclosure of CSR activities 
complements financial disclosure and affects analysts’ behavior in a more favorable way. One way to build a good 
reputation is to signal firms’ contribution to society by publicizing their CSR activities in great detail. 
 
As Paine (1994) suggests, managers in firms that voluntarily file CSR reports may have greater integrity 
over financial reporting or may show exemplary conduct by providing ethically sound financial report. Thus, firms 
that engage in voluntary CSR disclosures with GRI may provide higher quality of earnings. On the other hand, 
managers may have the incentive to misuse CSR disclosures to offset poor-quality earnings (Hobson and 
Kachelmeier, 2005). Managers may engage in CSR practices for personal benefit to pursue their self-interests or 
hide the true level of earnings management (Kim et al., 2012). Prior et al. (2008) state that managers may use CSR 
activities to obtain favorable coverage from the media and less scrutiny from investors and employees. CSR 
disclosure can also be used to mitigate the negative impact on firm value as a result of some corporate misconduct 
(Gray et al., 1995). When this opportunistic motivation dominates, firms who engage in voluntary CSR activities 
may have lower quality of earnings. To examine which motivation (either integrity or opportunistic) dominates, we 
test the association between donations and the voluntary issuance of CSR reports and earnings quality.  
 
Earnings quality 
 
Although a number of prior studies (e.g. Moore, 2001; Orlitzky, 2001; Torugsa et al., 2012) have focused 
on the relationship between CSR and financial performance, few studies have examined the role of CSR on earnings 
quality. Prior et al. (2008) examine whether firms use CSR strategically in financial reports. Using 593 firms 
included in the 2002-2004 SiRi Pro™ database, they find a positive relationship between discretionary accruals as 
computed based on the performance-matched model (Kothari et al., 2005) and a CSR score that is computed based 
on non-financial qualitative factors. Using the CSR index, Kim et al. (2012) find a negative relationship between 
earnings management
2
 and CSR scores
3
 in the U.S. However, Chih et al. (2008) find inconsistent evidence on 
earnings management by CSR firms. Reinhardt et al. (2008) report that there is a lack of evidence in literature of 
firms actually sacrificing their earnings goals through CSR activities. Unlike prior studies, we employ donation 
expenditures and the voluntary filing of CSR reports with GRI, which we believe are more direct or meaningful 
proxies that affect earnings quality measured as discretionary accruals and through accounting conservatism. 
 
The FASB (Financial Accounting Standards Board, 1980) defines conservatism as a prudent reaction to 
recognize uncertainty and risks in business situations. Prior studies assume that conservatism uses the level of the 
asymmetric accounting method for a prudent recognition of uncertainty (Givoly and Hayn, 2000; Penman and 
Zhang, 2002; Watts, 2003a, 2003b). Watts (2003b) reports that the important aspect of conservatism is to reduce 
agency and other social costs. Conservatism has commonly been stated as a proxy for a person’s integrity or ethics 
in psychology literature (Bogt et al., 2005). Taken together, in the world of business, conservatism would be the 
consequence of managers’ integrity as regards financial reporting. 
 
As CSR activities represent two different aspects of managers’ motivation, we investigate the role of 
corporate donations and the voluntary filing of CSR reports with GRI on earnings quality. The above argument leads 
to our two hypotheses in null form, as follows: 
 
H1:  Ceteris paribus, the level donation expenditures is not associated with earnings quality.  
 
H2:  Ceteris paribus, the voluntary issuance of CSR reports filed with GRI is not associated with earnings 
quality. 
                                           
2 Kim et al. (2012) also use performance-matched discretionary accruals (Kothari et al., 2005) as a proxy for earnings 
management. 
3 Kim et al. (2012) use CSR scores measured as total strengths minus total concerns based on KLD’s five social ratings. 
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Firms with greater donation levels would be more aware of the value of integrity and may also desire to 
signal their devotion to integrity to the market. Alternatively, firms with greater donation levels may want to disguise 
agency problems as a form of operating inefficiency and/or misconduct by voluntarily publicizing their CSR 
activities. One way to signal or fake their integrity is to file voluntary reports with GRI. Thus, we investigate 
whether firms with voluntary issuance of CSR reports filed with GRI experience an incremental effect on the 
association between donations and earnings quality. The above argument leads to our third hypothesis. 
 
H3:  Ceteris paribus, the voluntary issuance of CSR reports filed with GRI affects the association between the 
level of donation expenditures and earnings quality. 
 
If the first two hypotheses show a positive (negative) association between CSR activities and earnings 
quality, we predict that there would be a positive (negative) incremental effect caused by the voluntary filing of CSR 
reports with GRI on earnings quality. If donations and voluntary filing of CSR reports with GRI show different 
directional effects on earnings quality, the interaction effect of these two factors becomes ambiguous. The net effect 
depends on which factor dominates the effect. 
 
III.  RESEARCH METHOD and DATA SELECTION 
 
To test the hypotheses, we use the amount of donation expenses scaled by total assets, an indicator 
representing the voluntary filing of CSR reports with GRI, and the interaction between the donation and the 
voluntary filing of CSR reports. In order to measure earnings quality, we utilize discretionary accruals and 
accounting conservatism. Both discretionary accruals and accounting conservatism can be used as proxies for 
earnings management and transparency, respectively (Kim et al., 2012; Watts, 2003b). 
 
Firms donate money to various non-profit organizations and participate in community services as a part of 
their CSR efforts. The total donation amounts are disclosed in firms’ income statements. Because firms are seeking 
profits, the donation amounts would represent economic sacrifices by firms reflecting the most direct intention or 
preference of management over CSR. In addition, firms have voluntarily issued their CSR reports on the GRI 
website. The Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) provides standardized and comprehensive guidelines for CSR 
activities and is well regarded as the most authoritative and definitive program of global standards for corporate 
sustainability reporting. The GRI was established by the Coalition for Environmentally Responsible Economies 
(CERES), a group endorsed by the United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP) (see Willis (2003) for details). 
 
Earnings quality 
 
We use discretionary accruals (DAs) as a proxy for the quality of financial reporting, earnings management. 
DAs are subject to estimation errors. Thus, this study utilizes both the modified-Jones DAs (MJDA) model as 
suggested in Dechow et al. (1995) and the performance-matched DAs (PMDA) model suggested in Kothari et al. 
(2005). DAs are computed as equation (1) as used in Kothari et al. (2005) and as equation (2), which is used in 
Dechow et al. (1995). 
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where, 
 
TA = total accruals (net income – cash flow from operations) in year t for firm i;  
The Journal of Applied Business Research – May/June 2013 Volume 29, Number 3 
2013 The Clute Institute  Copyright by author(s) Creative Commons License CC-BY 949 
A = total assets in year t–1;  
∆REV = the difference between revenues in year t and in year t–1;  
∆AR = the difference between accounts receivable in year t and in year t–1;  
PPE
4
 = net depreciable property, plant, and equipment in year t;  
ROA = a return on assets in year t–1; 
PMDA = estimated residuals from model (1); 
MJDA = estimated residuals from model (2). 
 
Accounting conservatism 
 
Watts (2003a) states that conservative accounting plays an important role in improving information quality 
for investors. Penman and Zhang (2002) suggest a conservatism index, C-Score, which indicates that more 
conservative firms may have more reserves relative to net operating assets or may choose accounting methods that 
result in low net operating assets relative to estimated reserves. We use two methods to compute accounting 
conservatism. First, as in Penman and Zhang (2002), we use balance sheet items for estimating accounting 
conservatism (CONS_PENMAN) with both estimated reserves (ER) and net operating income (NOA). Second, as in 
Givoly and Hayn (2000), we use the accumulation of non-operating accruals (CONS_GIVOLY). We utilize these two 
measures to test the role of donation on accounting conservatism. 
 
_ / . (3)it it itCONS PENMAN ER NOA  
 
where, 
 
CONS_PENMAN = an accounting conservatism measure which utilizes Penman and Zhang’s (2002) approach;  
ER = the sum of depreciation expenses, amortization expenses, bad debt expenses, R&D expenses, and advertising 
expenses;  
NOA = the sum of equity and financial obligations, including short-term borrowings, the current portion of long-
term liabilities, long-term bonds, long-term borrowings, and capital lease liabilities less financial assets 
including short-term securities, short-term loans, and short-term financial instruments;  
 
_ ( 1) / . (4) it it itCONS GIVOLY Non Operating Accruals A
 
 
where, 
 
CONS_GIVOLY = an accounting conservatism measure which utilizes Givoly and Hayn’s (2000) approach;  
Non-Operating Accruals = total accruals excluding depreciation (TA_GIVOLY) less operating accruals (OA); 
TA_GIVOLY = NI + DEP - OCF; 
OA = ∆AR + ∆INV + ∆PREP - ∆AP - ∆TAXP; 
NI = net income;  
DEP = depreciation expenses;  
OCF = cash flows from operations;  
∆AR = the difference between accounts receivable in year t and in year t–1;  
∆INV = the difference between inventories in year t and in year t–1;  
∆PREP = the difference between prepaid expenses in year t and in year t–1;  
∆AP = the difference between accounts payable in year t and in year t–1;  
∆TAXP = the difference between taxes payable in year t and in year t–1;  
A = total assets in year t. 
 
                                           
4 Consistent with Culvenor et al. (1999), PPE excludes land and construction in progress. 
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Research model 
 
As in prior studies (Dhaliwal et al., 2011, 2012; Kim et al., 2012), we expect that corporate donations and 
the filing of CSR reports with GRI are associated with financial reporting quality in model (5). We use the following 
model to test the three hypotheses: 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
8 9 10 11 12 13
( ) * (5)
( ) & .
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      
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where,  
 
DA = PMDA or MJDA from equation (1) and (2);  
DONAT = level of computed donation expenses scaled by total assets in year t;  
D_CSR = 1 if a firm voluntarily issues CSR reports filed with GRI, and 0 otherwise; 
CONS = CONS_PENMAN or CONS_GIVOLY from equation (3) and (4);  
SIZE = the natural log of total assets;  
LEV = leverage as total debt scaled by total assets;  
GRW = sales changes scaled by prior sales;  
ROA = net income scaled by total assets;  
BIG = 1 if the auditor is a Big 4 auditor, and 0 otherwise;  
SWITCH = 1 if the auditor has changed, and 0 otherwise;  
OPINION = 1 if the auditor’s opinion is an unqualified opinion, and 0 otherwise;  
INVREC = the sum of inventory and accounts receivable scaled by total assets;  
LOSS = 1 if net income is less than zero, and 0 otherwise;  
PTA = the previous total accruals scaled by previous total assets;  
PCONS = CONS_PENMAN or CONS_GIVOLY in the previous year;  
IND and YEAR = dummies representing two-digit SIC industries and years. 
 
Consistent with prior studies (e.g., Dechow et al., 1995; Givoly and Hayn, 2000; Jones, 1991; Kothari et al., 
2005; Penman and Zhang, 2002), earnings quality is measured through the level of discretionary accruals and 
conservatism. We include the interaction term DONAT and D_CSR, as firms with increased DONAT and voluntary 
CSR filings are expected to choose more/less conservative accounting methods and lower/higher earnings 
management than others.  
 
As in prior studies (DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1993, 1994; Francis et al., 1999, Reynolds and Francis, 2001; 
Simunic, 1980), we expect that firms of a smaller size, greater leverage, a lower growth rate, higher returns, more 
inventory and accounts receivable, and negative income are likely to manage earnings through discretionary accruals 
and to provide financial reports in a less conservative way. Firms with non-Big 4 auditors, new auditors, and 
qualified opinions may engage in earnings management and less conservatism (Palmrose, 1988; DeFond and 
Subramanyam, 1998; Reynolds and Francis, 2001; Francis, 2004). 
 
Based on prior research, several control variables are added. SIZE may reflect the effects from omitted 
variables on earnings quality (Becker et al. 1998). LEV may capture managers’ opportunistic behaviors pertaining to 
earnings quality, as managers may manage earnings to avoid violations of debt covenants (DeFond and Jiambalvo, 
1994). Ahmed et al. (2002) report a negative relationship between accruals and GRW or ROA. Penman and Zhang 
(2002) suggest that conservatism decreases the accounting rate of return. Together, we expect that GRW and ROA 
are positively related to discretionary accruals and are negatively related to accounting conservatism. As in DeFond 
and Subramanyam (1998), auditors, who are concerned with litigation risk, may decrease discretionary accruals or 
increase the level of conservatism. BIG and OPINION are expected to increase an auditor’s litigation exposure and 
are therefore negatively related to discretionary accruals and positively related to conservatism. We expect that 
SWITCH shows an opposite relationship to BIG and OPINION, consistent with hope by managers (Ahmed et al., 
2002). INVREC may show the same negative direction as GRW and ROA, as growing and more profitable firms are 
prone to have greater inventories and/or accounts receivable (Ahmed et al., 2002; Simunic, 1980). The effect of 
The Journal of Applied Business Research – May/June 2013 Volume 29, Number 3 
2013 The Clute Institute  Copyright by author(s) Creative Commons License CC-BY 951 
LOSS on earnings quality is controversial. As in Becker et al. (1998), financial distress leads to reduced earnings for 
contractual renegotiations, whereas DeFond and Park (1997) argue that managers with poor performance have an 
incentive to increase income earnings management in order to reduce the threat of being dismissed. 
 
Table 1 
Sample Descriptions 
Panel A. Sample Selection Criteria 2004-2010     
Sample selection  DA  CONS 
All firm-year observations from the Korea Stock Exchange (KSE)  5,495  5,495 
(Less) Financial service  (609)  (609) 
(Less) Firms with insufficient financial data  (494)  (435) 
(Less) Firms that do not have December fiscal year-end  (152)  (152) 
(Less) Firms in industries with less than ten firms  (42)  (42) 
Final Sample Size  4,198  4,257 
 
Panel B. Samples by year  DA  CONS 
Year  Firms %  Firms % 
2004  581 13.84  587 13.79 
2005  588 14.01  593 13.93 
2006  592 14.10  596 14.00 
2007  595 14.17  606 14.24 
2008  605 14.41  613 14.40 
2009  612 14.58  627 14.73 
2010  625 14.89  635 14.92 
Total  4,198 100  4,257 100 
 
Panel C. Samples by industries  DA  CONS 
  Firms %  Firms % 
Food, Beverages, Tobacco Products  252 6.00  254 5.97 
Wearing apparel, Wood, and Pulp Products  347 8.27  351 8.25 
Cokes and Chemical Products  555 13.22  565 13.27 
Medicinal Chemicals  244 5.81  245 5.76 
Non-metallic Mineral and Metal Products  512 12.20  515 12.10 
Electronic Components and Precision Instruments  419 9.98  423 9.94 
Other manufacturing  527 12.55  536 12.59 
Electricity, Gas, Construction, Real estate activities  371 8.84  372 8.74 
Sale of Motor Vehicles and Parts, and Transportation  358 8.53  364 8.55 
Information and Communications  105 2.50  105 2.47 
Wholesale Trade, and Other service activities  508 12.10  527 12.38 
Total  4,198 100  4,257 100 
       
 
Data selection 
 
As presented in Table 1, Panel A, the sample used in this study consists of firms listed on the Korea Stock 
Exchange (KSE)
5
 from 2004 to 2010. We exclude firms in financial service industries, those with insufficient 
financial data and non-December fiscal year-end firms, as well as those with fewer than ten observations within a 
respective industry. Panels B and C of Table 1 present firm-year and firm-industry distributions showing that year or 
industry cluster is not a serious concern. Financial data are extracted from the KIS-VALUE
6
 database, and the CSR 
reports are obtained from the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) website. 
                                           
5 The KSE had a market capitalization of around 1.2 trillion USD as of the end of 2011. As of 2011, the market capitalization is 
ranked seventeenth in the world (refer to http://www.world-exchanges.org). 
6 The KIS-VALUE database in Korea provides both financial and stock market data for firms listed on the Korea Stock 
Exchange and KOSDAQ markets, equivalent to COMPUSTAT and CRSP in the U.S. 
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Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A. DA models (N=4,198)             
  MEAN  STD  Min  Q1  Median  Q3  Max 
PMDA  0.0001  0.0920  -0.3591  -0.0448  0.0003  0.0455  0.3366 
MJDA  0.0043  0.0974  -0.3775  -0.0401  0.0044  0.0503  0.4050 
DONAT  0.0011  0.0022  0.0000  0.0000  0.0002  0.0011  0.0126 
D-CSR  0.0264  0.1605  0  0  0  0  1 
SIZE  26.4377  1.4836  23.5517  25.3759  26.1499  27.2904  30.5910 
LEV  0.4457  0.1923  0.0737  0.3027  0.4516  0.5844  0.9683 
GRW  0.1204  0.3431  -0.6954  -0.0195  0.0803  0.1943  2.5837 
ROA  0.0349  0.0863  -0.4114  0.0107  0.0415  0.0767  0.2489 
BIG  0.6901  0.4625  0  0  1  1  1 
SWITCH  0.2032  0.4024  0  0  0  0  1 
OPINION  0.9983  0.0408  0  1  1  1  1 
INVREC  0.2733  0.1543  0.0000  0.1583  0.2648  0.3782  0.6646 
LOSS  0.1677  0.3736  0  0  0  0  1 
PTA  -0.0182  0.0995  -0.3891  -0.0637  -0.0187  0.0297  0.3338 
 
Panel B. CONS models (N=4,257)            
  MEAN  STD  Min  Q1  Median  Q3  Max 
CONS-PENMAN  0.0792   0.0813   0.0009   0.0327   0.0568   0.0956   0.5692 
CONS-GIVOLY  -0.0056   0.0801   -0.3908   -0.0288   -0.0034   0.0189   0.3494 
DONAT  0.0011   0.0022   0.0000    0.0000   0.0002    0.0011    0.0126  
D-CSR  0.0263   0.1601   0   0   0   0   1 
SIZE  26.4367   1.4831   23.4713   25.3784   26.1501   27.2865   30.5733 
LEV  0.4453   0.1930   0.0627   0.3015   0.4516   0.5846   0.9677 
GRW  0.1322   0.3744   -0.7090   -0.0185   0.0818   0.1993   2.5837 
ROA  0.0352   0.0862   -0.4114   0.0107   0.0415   0.0769   0.2558 
BIG  0.6911   0.4621   0   0   1   1   1 
SWITCH  0.2023   0.4017   0   0   0   0   1 
OPINION  0.9984   0.0405   0   1   1   1   1 
INVREC  0.2728   0.1549   0.0000   0.1576   0.2647   0.3783   0.6696 
LOSS  0.1675   0.3735   0   0   0   0   1 
PCONS-PENMAN  0.0821   0.0822   0.0009   0.0349   0.0599   0.0991   0.5692 
PCONS-GIVOLY  -0.0016   0.0835   -0.3908   -0.0270   -0.0018   0.0211   0.3494 
Definitions of variables are in table 4. 
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Table 3 
Pearson Correlation Matrix 
Panel A. DA models (N=4,198)        
 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1.DONAT 0.0240 0.0237 0.0800 -0.1321 0.0289 0.2115 0.1010 -0.0288 -0.0007 0.0397 -0.1467 -0.0110 
 0.1206 0.1249 <.0001 <.0001 0.0611 <.0001 <.0001 0.0621 0.9639 0.0102 <.0001 0.4783 
2.D-CSR   0.9983 0.3533 0.0240 -0.0049 0.0333 0.1018 -0.0205 0.0067 -0.1212 -0.0144 -0.0362 
 
 
<.0001 <.0001 0.1199 0.7492 0.0310 <.0001 0.1843 0.6626 <.0001 0.3521 0.0191 
3.PAGE     0.3529 0.0236 -0.0055 0.0338 0.1022 -0.0199 0.0067 -0.1209 -0.0143 -0.0366 
    <.0001 0.1263 0.7240 0.0283 <.0001 0.1978 0.6632 <.0001 0.3532 0.0178 
4.SIZE       0.1715 0.0211 0.1842 0.3586 -0.0323 0.0143 -0.3593 -0.1661 0.0102 
      <.0001 0.1724 <.0001 <.0001 0.0367 0.3535 <.0001 <.0001 0.5077 
5.LEV         0.0815 -0.3122 0.0444 0.0003 -0.0579 0.1236 0.2206 -0.1008 
        <.0001 <.0001 0.0041 0.9845 0.0002 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
6.GRW           0.1259 0.0059 0.0213 0.0098 0.0528 -0.0855 -0.0458 
          <.0001 0.7032 0.1685 0.5250 0.0006 <.0001 0.0030 
7.ROA             0.1367 -0.0131 0.1328 0.0315 -0.6893 0.0753 
            <.0001 0.3973 <.0001 0.0415 <.0001 <.0001 
8.BIG               -0.0255 0.0113 -0.1200 -0.0829 -0.0031 
              0.0987 0.4638 <.0001 <.0001 0.8431 
9.SWITCH                 0.0206 0.0049 -0.0017 -0.0112 
                0.1812 0.7502 0.9144 0.4682 
10.OPINION                   0.0164 -0.0754 -0.0095 
                  0.2882 <.0001 0.5374 
11.INVREC                     -0.0296 0.0920 
                    0.0550 <.0001 
12.LOSS                       -0.0614 
                      <.0001 
13.PTA             
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Panel B. CONS models (N=4,257)     
 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1.DONAT 0.0243 0.0241 0.0804 -0.1280 0.0280 0.2116 0.1013 -0.0281 -0.0007 0.0415 -0.1468 0.1458 0.0297 
 0.1128 0.1164 <.0001 <.0001 0.0681 <.0001 <.0001 0.0665 0.9623 0.0068 <.0001 <.0001 0.0524 
2.D-CSR   0.9982 0.3503 0.0225 -0.0066 0.0341 0.1014 -0.0207 0.0067 -0.1199 -0.0148 0.0605 -0.0013 
 
 
<.0001 <.0001 0.1430 0.6656 0.0263 <.0001 0.1779 0.6635 <.0001 0.3352 <.0001 0.9314 
3.PAGE     0.3497 0.0218 -0.0067 0.0348 0.1018 -0.0201 0.0067 -0.1196 -0.0148 0.0614 -0.0010 
    <.0001 0.1545 0.6634 0.0232 <.0001 0.1893 0.6640 <.0001 0.3340 <.0001 0.9470 
4.SIZE       0.1715 0.0264 0.1815 0.3598 -0.0318 0.0145 -0.3573 -0.1665 -0.0486 -0.0593 
      <.0001 0.0851 <.0001 <.0001 0.0380 0.3436 <.0001 <.0001 0.0015 0.0001 
5.LEV         0.0786 -0.3121 0.0464 0.0006 -0.0573 0.1287 0.2225 0.0670 0.1035 
        <.0001 <.0001 0.0025 0.9690 0.0002 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
6.GRW           0.1239 0.0107 0.0052 0.0102 0.0382 -0.0822 -0.0164 0.1234 
          <.0001 0.4862 0.7331 0.5054 0.0127 <.0001 0.2842 <.0001 
7.ROA             0.1332 -0.0141 0.1322 0.0306 -0.6874 -0.0449 -0.0449 
            <.0001 0.3573 <.0001 0.0457 <.0001 0.0034 0.0034 
8.BIG               -0.0257 0.0113 -0.1189 -0.0818 0.0242 -0.0366 
              0.0942 0.4603 <.0001 <.0001 0.1146 0.0170 
9.SWITCH                 0.0204 0.0026 -0.0019 0.0266 -0.0141 
                0.1825 0.8664 0.9018 0.0832 0.3588 
10.OPINION                   0.0161 -0.0750 -0.0399 -0.0107 
                  0.2938 <.0001 0.0093 0.4840 
11.INVREC                     -0.0260 -0.0101 0.1178 
                    0.0904 0.5090 <.0001 
12.LOSS                       0.0445 0.0552 
                      0.0037 0.0003 
13.PCONS-PENMAN                         - 
                        - 
14.PCONS-GIVOLY              
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IV.  EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
Descriptive statistics 
 
Table 2, Panel A and Panel B, presents descriptive statistics of the test and control variables. We winsorize 
variables with continuous values at the 1
st
 and the 99
th
 percentiles to control for the effects of extreme observations. 
The mean value of the performance-matched discretionary accruals (PMDA) is 0.0001, while that of the modified 
Jones discretionary accruals (MJDA) is 0.0043, consistent with Kothari et al. (2005), who also report a smaller 
PMDA value than the MJDA value. Regarding accounting conservatism, the mean value of CONS_PENMAN is 
0.0792 that is greater than the mean value of CONS_GIVOLY (-0.0056). Big 4 auditors audit about 69 percent of 
firms, and about 20 percent of firms changed their auditors during the sample period for both the DA (Panel A) and 
CONS (Panel B) samples. About 0.2 percent of sample firms received a qualified opinion, and about 16.8 percent of 
firms experienced losses.  
 
Table 3 reports the correlation matrix among the variables used in the empirical analyses. Table 3, Panel A, 
shows that the highest correlation is -0.6893 between ROA and LOSS. The correlation coefficients of the rest of the 
variables are not very high. Table 3, Panel B, also shows similar results in that the correlation coefficient between 
ROA and LOSS is -0.6874. The remaining variables are not highly correlated.
7
 The highest VIF value in any of the 
regression analyses is 2.2 in both models, indicating that multicollinearity is not a serious concern. 
 
Regression results 
 
Table 4 shows the empirical results of multivariate regression analyses to test three hypotheses. The DA 
models show the relationship between donations and discretionary accruals. DONAT is significant and negatively 
associated with discretionary accruals in both the PMDA and MJDA models (significant at the 1 percent level). This 
result is consistent with Chih et al. (2008) and Kim et al. (2012)
8, indicating that managers’ discretion over financial 
reporting decreases with the level of corporate donation. This result also suggests that firms with higher donation 
expenditures are less prone to engage in earnings management through discretionary accruals, rejecting H1.
9
 
D_CSR is insignificant in both DA models, failing to find evidence of an association between the voluntary issuance 
of CSR reports and earnings quality. 
 
The CONS models show a relationship between donation expenditure and accounting conservatism. 
DONAT is significant and positively associated with accounting conservatism in both the CONS_PENMAN and 
CONS_GIVOLY models (significant at the 1 percent level), indicating that managers’ discretion over accounting 
conservatism increases with the level of corporate donation. As in the results from the DA models, D_CSR is 
statistically insignificant in both CONS models, failing to find evidence of an association between the voluntary 
issuance of CSR reports and earnings quality. 
 
The interaction term DONAT*D_CSR is negative and significant at the 1 percent level in both the PMDA 
and MJDA models. These results suggest that the significantly negative association between DONAT and PMDA 
(and MJDA) becomes stronger when firms voluntarily issue CSR reports with GRI. This result indicates that firms 
voluntarily filing CSR reports enhance the association between donations and earnings quality. However, the 
interaction terms DONAT*D_CSR in both the CONS_PENMAN and CONS_GIVOLY models are statistically 
insignificant. 
                                           
7 Dropping either ROA or LOSS does not change our conclusion and provides qualitatively identical results. 
8 Chih et al. (2008) report a relationship between CSR and earnings management (EM). However, they use FTSE4Good Indexes 
as a proxy for CSR activities rather than the level of donation expenses, and the measures of EM are based on Bhattacharya et al. 
(2003) and Leuz et al. (2003). Kim et al. (2012) use a combined score of KLD’s five social ratings based on surveys, financial 
statements, and articles by KLD Research and Analytics as a proxy of the level of CSR activities and use Domini 400 Social 
Index as a proxy for a dummy variable of CSR activities. 
9 When we use the Generalized Least Squares (GLS) model to mitigate heteroscadacity and auto-correlation problems discussed 
in LeClair and Gordon (2000), the results for the main variables by GLS regression are not qualitatively different from the results 
by OLS. 
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Consistent with prior studies (e.g., Ahmed et al., 2002; DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994; Reynolds and Francis, 
2001; among others), LEV, ROA and INVREC are positively related to discretionary accruals, suggesting that firms 
with higher leverage, higher returns on assets, and more inventory and accounts receivable experience a greater 
managers’ discretion over financial reporting, while SIZE is negatively associated with discretionary accruals. LEV, 
GRW, ROA, and LOSS are significant in both the CONS_PENMAN and CONS_GIVOLY models at least at the 10 
percent level. BIG, SWITCH, and PCONS_PENMAN are significant only in the CONS_PENMAN model, while SIZE, 
OPINION, INVREC, and PCONS_GIVOLY are significant only in the CONS_GIVOLY model. 
 
Table 4 
The Relationship between Donations or CSR Reports and Earnings Quality 
Variables 
  DA models  CONS models  
  PMDA  MJDA  CONS-PENMAN  CONS-GIVOLY  
Intercept   0.0153 0.0587 0.0718 -0.0433 
   (0.34) 
 
(1.27) (2.44) 
** 
-(1.18) 
DONAT   -2.9305 
 
-3.4728 3.2333 
 
2.7124 
 
   -(4.40) 
*** 
-(5.09) 
*** 
(7.43) 
*** 
(4.97) 
*** 
D-CSR   0.0150 
 
0.0041 
 
0.0059 
 
0.0012 
 
   (1.31) 
 
(0.35) 
 
(0.79) 
 
(0.13) 
 
DONAT* D-CSR   -16.2498 
 
-13.7039 
 
4.7105 
 
2.0569 
 
   -(3.26) 
*** 
-(2.68) 
*** 
(1.45) 
 
(0.50) 
 
SIZE   -0.0022 
 
-0.0023 
 
-0.0003 
 
0.0040 
 
   -(1.83) 
* 
-(1.91) 
* 
-(0.36) 
 
(4.14) 
*** 
LEV   0.0233 
 
0.0108 
 
0.0090 
 
-0.0151 
 
   (2.80) 
*** 
(1.27) 
 
(1.67) 
* 
-(2.22) 
** 
GRW   0.0041 
 
0.0026 
 
0.0086 
 
0.0170 
 
   (1.01) 
 
(0.62) 
 
(3.61) 
*** 
(5.64) 
*** 
ROA   0.4064 
 
0.5073 
 
-0.2158 
 
-0.4584 
 
   (17.67) 
*** 
(21.52) 
*** 
-(14.50) 
*** 
-(24.42) 
*** 
BIG   -0.0020 
 
-0.0049 
 
0.0041 
 
-0.0016 
 
   -(0.63) 
 
-(1.52)  (1.99) 
** 
-(0.63) 
 
SWITCH   0.0013 
 
0.0013 
 
-0.0054 
 
0.0017 
 
   (0.38) 
 
(0.39) 
 
-(2.49) 
** 
(0.63) 
 
OPINION   0.0038 
 
-0.0200 
 
-0.0275 
 
-0.0677 
 
   (0.12) 
 
-(0.59) 
 
-(1.27) 
 
-(2.49) 
** 
INVREC   0.0500 
 
0.0427 
 
0.0100 
 
0.0804 
 
   (4.56) 
*** 
(3.80) 
*** 
(1.42) 
 
(9.06) 
*** 
LOSS   0.0051 
 
0.0077 
 
-0.0089 
 
-0.0119 
 
   (1.01) 
 
(1.50) 
 
-(2.73) 
*** 
-(2.91) 
*** 
PTA   -0.0095 
 
0.0609 
 
- 
 
- 
 
   -(0.69)  (4.29) 
*** 
 
 
 
 
PCONS-PENMAN   - 
 
- 
 
0.6314 
 
- 
 
    
 
 
 
(56.53) 
*** 
 
 
PCONS-GIVOLY   - 
 
- 
 
- 
 
0.0634 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
(4.71) 
*** 
IND/YEAR   Included 
 
Included 
 
Included 
 
Included 
 
F-value    21.07 
*** 
32.49 
*** 
160.41 
*** 
40.67 
*** 
Adj R square   0.1218 0.1787 0.5207 0.2128 
Max VIF   2.23 2.23 2.21 2.21 
N   4,198 4,198 4,257 4,257 
Notes: ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
PMDA is performance-matched discretionary accruals from Eq.(1), MJDA is the modified Jones’ discretionary accruals from Eq.(2), 
CONS-PENMAN denotes the conservatism measures of Penman and Zhang (2002) from Eq.(3), CONS-GIVOLY represents the 
conservatism measures of Givoly and Hayn (2000) from Eq.(4), DONAT is the donation amount scaled by total assets, D-CSR is 1 if a 
firm discloses CSR reports on GRI and 0 otherwise, DONAT*D-CSR is an interaction term for DONAT and D-CSR, SIZE is the natural 
log of total assets, LEV is leverage as total debt scaled by total assets, GRW denotes sales changes scaled by prior sales, ROA is net 
income scaled by total assets, BIG is 1 if the auditor is a Big 4 auditor and 0 otherwise, SWITCH is 1 if the auditor was changed and 0 
otherwise, OPINION is 1 if the auditor’s opinion is an unqualified opinion and 0 otherwise, INVREC is the sum of inventory and 
accounts receivable scaled by total assets, LOSS is 1 if net income is less than zero and 0 otherwise, PTA is the prior total accruals 
scaled by prior total assets, PCONS-PENMAN is the previous year’s CONS-PENMAN, PCONS-GIVOLY is the previous year’s CONS-
GIVOLY, IND/YEAR is a dummy variable for each industry and each year. 
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In summary, we find that firms incurring greater expenses for donations exercise lower management 
discretion and greater accounting conservatism over financial reporting. This result suggests that managers who 
donate higher percentage of their firms’ total assets may have a greater level of corporate integrity, which is 
consistent with management’s philanthropic viewpoint and the stakeholder hypothesis (Bentham, 1996; Carroll, 
1999). There is evidence that this phenomenon is more pronounced when firms voluntarily issue CSR reports filed 
with GRI. 
 
Abnormal corporate donation 
 
Amato and Amato (2007) find that the level of corporate donation is significantly related to the firm size, 
advertising expenditures, and ROA. To control for endogenous effects of donation expenditures (DONAT) by firm-
specific factors, we compute residuals as abnormal donations (ABNDONAT) from equation (6). 
 
2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 . (6)             it it it it it it itDONAT ADV ROA SIZE SIZE SIZE IND  
 
where, 
 
DONAT = donation expenses scaled by total assets in year t;  
ADV = advertising expenses scaled by total assets in year t;  
ROA = net income scaled by total assets in year t;  
SIZE = the natural log of total assets in year t; 
IND = dummies representing two-digit SIC industries. 
 
We then replace DONAT with ABNDONAT in model (5). Table 5 reports the results of the additional analyses 
using abnormal donations instead of the level of donation. ABNDONAT
10
 denotes the residuals between DONAT 
and the estimated DONAT, and ABNDONAT is significant in the PMDA (t-value: -3.65, sig. at the 1 percent level), 
MJDA (t-value: -4.51), CONS_PENMAN (t-value: 4.79), and CONS_GIVOLY (t-value: 4.20) models. These findings 
suggest that firms with greater additional donation expenditures than expected are prone to engage less in earnings 
management through discretionary accruals and to choose conservative accounting methods, rejecting H1. The filing 
of voluntary CSR reports, D_CSR, shows a coefficient consistent with expectations. However, the result is 
significant only with the MJDA (at the 10 percent level) and CONS_PENMAN (at the 5 percent level) models. The 
interaction term ABNDONAT*D_CSR is consistently related to earnings quality in both DA and CONS models, as 
predicted, but we fail to find statistically significant evidence of an incremental effect of the filing of CSR reports on 
the association between ABNDONAT and earnings quality. 
 
From the results of the additional regression analyses, we also provide generally consistent evidence of the 
notion that firms with more active CSR activities are associated with higher levels of earnings quality than others. 
 
Level of voluntary CSR reporting 
 
This study also investigates whether the volume of CSR disclosure is associated with earnings quality. 
Following Dhaliwal et al. (2012), we use the number of pages as a proxy for the level of CSR effort. Table 6 shows 
additional analyses of the volume of voluntary CSR reporting.
11
 To compare the level of CSR reporting, we replace 
D_CSR with PAGE, which represents the quantitative level of the CSR reporting effort. If the number of pages in 
voluntary CSR reports indicates the managers’ eager willingness to disclose details of CSR activities, we expect that 
the effect of donation on earnings quality in each model is increased with an increase in the level of CSR reporting 
                                           
10 To compute ABNDONAT, we utilized the generalize least squares (GLS) which avoids heteroscadacity. The results with 
ABNDONAT in OLS regression are not qualitatively different from results in GLS. 
11 When we conduct the analyses with ABNDONAT and PAGE, which are not reported here, we find results similar to those with 
ABNDONAT and D_CSR. 
The Journal of Applied Business Research – May/June 2013 Volume 29, Number 3 
958 Copyright by author(s) Creative Commons License CC-BY 2013 The Clute Institute 
effort. These findings suggest that firms that strive to disclose CSR activities are less prone to engage in earnings 
management through discretionary accruals and to choose conservative accounting, rejecting H1.  
 
Table 5 
The Relationship between ABNDONAT or CSR Reports and Earnings Quality 
Variables 
  DA models  CONS models  
  PMDA  MJDA  CONS-PENMAN  CONS-GIVOLY  
Intercept   0.0226 
 0.0677 0.0626 -0.0492 
   (0.50) 
 (1.47) (2.12) ** -(1.33)  
ABNDONAT   -2.5354 
 -3.2105  2.1591  2.3798  
   -(3.65) 
*** -(4.51) *** (4.79) *** (4.20) *** 
D-CSR   -0.0081 
 -0.0154  0.0123  0.0042  
   -(0.90) 
 -(1.67) * (2.10) ** (0.57)  
ABNDONAT* D-CSR   -5.0918 
 -2.8217  0.0778  1.6972  
   -(0.81)  -(0.44)  (0.02) 
 (0.33)  
SIZE   -0.0026 
 -0.0028  0.0002  0.0043  
   -(2.22) 
** -(2.35) ** (0.28)  (4.50) *** 
LEV   0.0252 
 0.0125  0.0068  -0.0156  
   (3.02) 
*** (1.46)  (1.26)  -(2.30) ** 
GRW   0.0042 
 0.0027  0.0087  0.0170  
   (1.05) 
 (0.66)  (3.63) *** (5.62) *** 
ROA   0.3938 
 0.4928  -0.2029  -0.4478  
   (17.19) 
*** (21.00) *** -(13.66) *** -(23.98) *** 
BIG   -0.0021 
 -0.0050  0.0043  -0.0015  
   -(0.65) 
 -(1.54)  (2.11) 
** -(0.57)  
SWITCH   0.0013 
 0.0013  -0.0056  0.0017  
   (0.39) 
 (0.39)  -(2.57) ** (0.63)  
OPINION   0.0045 
 -0.0197  -0.0279  -0.0675  
   (0.14) 
 -(0.58)  -(1.29)  -(2.48) ** 
INVREC   0.0487 
 0.0415  0.0116  0.0809  
   (4.43) 
*** (3.68) *** (1.64)  (9.11) *** 
LOSS   0.0046 
 0.0072  -0.0085  -0.0116  
   (0.93) 
 (1.39)  -(2.60) *** -(2.84) *** 
PTA   -0.0079 
 0.0623  -  -  
   -(0.57)  (4.39) 
***     
PCONS-PENMAN   - 
 -  0.6392  -  
    
   (57.35) ***   
PCONS-GIVOLY   - 
 -  -  0.0642  
    
     (4.76) *** 
IND/ YEAR   Included 
 Included  Included  Included  
F-value    20.35 
*** 31.88 *** 160.41 *** 40.34 *** 
Adj R square   0.1179 
 0.1758  0.5207 0.2114  
Max VIF   2.20 
 2.20  2.18 2.18 
N   4,198 4,198 4,257 4,257 
Notes: ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
ABNDONAT denotes the abnormal donation amount scaled by total assets from Eq.(5). Definitions of other variables are in table 4. 
 
Table 6 shows results similar to those in Table 4 with D_CSR. Consistent with the results of D_CSR, PAGE is 
not statistically significant in both the DA and CONS models. The interaction term (DONAT*PAGE), however, is 
significantly associated with earnings quality in both the PMDA and MJDA models. Additional analyses confirm our 
findings in Table 4, showing that firms with active CSR, in terms of monetary donations and actively publicized 
activities, are more likely to have even higher earnings quality than firms without any active publication of CSR 
activities. 
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Table 6 
The Relationship between Donations or Volume of CSR Reports and Earnings Quality 
Variables 
  DA models  CONS models  
  PMDA  MJDA  CONS-PENMAN  CONS-GIVOLY  
Intercept   0.0152 0.0587 0.0724 -0.0423 
   (0.34) (1.28) (2.47) 
** -(1.15)  
DONAT   -2.9408 
 -3.4817  3.2349  2.7149  
   -(4.41) 
*** -(5.10) *** (7.43) *** (4.97) *** 
PAGE   0.0031 
 0.0007  0.0015  0.0006  
   (1.20) 
 (0.27)  (0.87)  (0.26)  
DONAT* PAGE   -3.4940 
 -2.9465  1.0503  0.4209  
   -(3.09) 
*** -(2.54) ** (1.42)  (0.45)  
SIZE   -0.0022 
 -0.0023  -0.0003  0.0040  
   -(1.83) 
* -(1.92) * -(0.39)  (4.11) *** 
LEV   0.0234 
 0.0109  0.0090  -0.0150  
   (2.81) 
*** (1.28)  (1.67) * -(2.22) ** 
GRW   0.0041 
 0.0026  0.0086  0.0170  
   (1.02) 
 (0.62)  (3.62) *** (5.64) *** 
ROA   0.4064 
 0.5073  -0.2158  -0.4584  
   (17.67) 
*** (21.52) *** -(14.50) *** -(24.42) *** 
BIG   -0.0020 
 -0.0049  0.0041  -0.0016  
   -(0.63) 
 -(1.52)  (1.99) 
** -(0.63)  
SWITCH   0.0013 
 0.0013  -0.0054  0.0017  
   (0.38) 
 (0.39)  -(2.50) ** (0.63)  
OPINION   0.0039 
 -0.0200  -0.0275  -0.0677  
   (0.12) 
 -(0.59)  -(1.27)  -(2.49) ** 
INVREC   0.0500 
 0.0427  0.0100  0.0804  
   (4.56) 
*** (3.80) *** (1.42)  (9.06) *** 
LOSS   0.0051 
 0.0077  -0.0089  -0.0119  
   (1.01) 
 (1.49)  -(2.74) *** -(2.92) *** 
PTA   -0.0094 
 0.0609  -  -  
   -(0.68)  (4.30) 
***     
PCONS-PENMAN   - 
 -  0.6313  -  
    
   (56.52) ***   
PCONS-GIVOLY   - 
 -  -  0.0634  
    
     (4.71) *** 
IND/YEAR   Included 
 Included  Included  Included  
F-value    21.02 
*** 32.46 *** 160.44 *** 40.67 *** 
Adj R square   0.1215 0.1786 0.5207 
 0.2128  
Max VIF   2.23 2.23 2.21 
 2.21 
N   4,198 4,198 4,257 4,257 
Notes: ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
PAGE is the natural log of total pages of CSR reports. Definitions of other variables are in table 4. 
 
V.  CONCLUSIONS 
 
This study examines whether corporate donations and the voluntary issuance of CSR reports are associated 
with earnings quality. High-quality earnings are the result of transparent and conservative accounting choices (Watts, 
2003a). Donation expenditures could be the most direct and objective measure of managers’ willingness to conduct 
CSR activities. This study also utilizes the filing of voluntary issuances of CSR reports with GRI because it is 
deemed to be a good proxy for managers’ willingness to conduct CSR activities. After controlling for firm-specific 
factors, this study provides evidence that firms with higher levels of corporate donation have lower discretionary 
accruals and greater accounting conservatism. Furthermore, this study finds that the relationship between donations 
and earnings quality is more pronounced when firms voluntarily issue CSR reports filed with GRI. This study 
enables academics and practitioners to understand the role of corporate donations and voluntary CSR disclosure on 
earnings quality as proxied by managers’ levels of discretion in regards to financial reporting and conservative 
accounting choices.  
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This study adds to the existing CSR literature by providing additional evidence of the role of CSR activities 
on earnings quality. This study also helps capital market participants to improve their understanding of manager 
integrity and business ethics associated with CSR. Future studies may examine the effect of various characteristics 
of managers and/or governance characteristics on CSR activities and their decision-making activities. 
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